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Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy1 
 
Martin Smith 
 
Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world 
semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible 
worlds.  I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that 
incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause.  Although such conditionals are 
commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness 
amongst philosophers.  By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species of variably strict conditional I 
hope to shed new light upon their content and their logic.   
 
Key Words: Ceteris paribus conditional, subjunctive conditional, possible world semantics, comparative 
normalcy 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
By a ‘ceteris paribus conditional’ I shall mean a subjunctive conditional in which the 
relationship between antecedent and consequent is mediated by a qualifying ceteris 
paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause.  Any conditional of the form ‘If __ were the 
case, then ceteris paribus … would be the case’ counts as a ceteris paribus conditional.  
Many law-statements in the sciences have the form of ceteris paribus conditionals, so 
defined.   
 
Consider, for instance, the principle of natural selection.  As formulated by Elliott 
Sober (1984, pp27) the principle of natural selection states the following: If (a) the 
organisms in a population possessing trait T were better able to survive and reproduce 
than organisms possessing trait T′ and (b) T and T′ are heritable traits, then (c) the 
proportion of organisms in the population with trait T would increase.   
 
                                                  
1
 Thanks go to Martin Davies, Andy Egan, Peter Roeper and an anonymous referee for this journal, all of 
whom provided valuable comments and criticism.  Thanks also to audiences at the Australian National 
University and the 2005 Australasian Association of Logic conference. 
 2
The evolution of actual populations will not always conform to this principle, 
however.  There are various possible sources of interference.  The genes controlling trait 
T could, for instance, mutate or they could be linked to genes controlling maladaptive 
traits.  Furthermore, random genetic drift can be a significant factor, particularly in small 
populations.  It would be quite possible for the antecedent of the above conditional to be 
satisfied without the consequent being satisfied.  Thus, as Sober remarks, ‘a ceteris 
paribus clause needs to be added here’ (Sober, 1984, pp27-28).   
 
Ceteris paribus conditionals are not peculiar to scientific theorising.  In more 
colloquial settings, however, we sometimes prefer to use qualifying phrases such as 
‘normally’, ‘ordinarily’, ‘typically’, ‘as a rule’ and the like rather than the more formal 
‘other things being equal’ or ‘ceteris paribus’.  In my view these colloquial hedging 
clauses can be perfectly well substituted for ceteris paribus clauses without any change in 
content.  Indeed, most of my examples will be drawn not from science, but the mundane. 
 
In this paper I offer a semantic analysis of ceteris paribus conditionals.  I shall  
employ the framework of possible world semantics.  That is, I shall offer an account of 
how the truth value, at a particular possible world, of a ceteris paribus conditional is 
determined by the truth values, at various possible worlds, of its antecedent and its 
consequent. 
  
It is widely believed that ceteris paribus clauses are either (i) shorthand for an 
explicit list of background provisos or (ii) catch-alls that render a conditional logically or 
vacuously true (see, for instance, Schiffer, 1987, pp287, 1991, Hempel, 1988, Earman 
and Roberts, 1999, Earman, Roberts and Smith, 2002).  I accept neither alternative.  I 
believe that ceteris paribus clauses are needed precisely when no explicit list of 
background provisos is available – as is arguably the case with the principle of natural 
selection (see Pietroski and Rey, 1995, pp87).  I also believe that ceteris paribus 
conditionals can express perfectly substantial claims about the world and are governed by 
a non-trivial logic.  
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The (i)/(ii) dilemma partly stems from the idea that a ceteris paribus clause works 
by further qualifying or strengthening the antecedent of a conditional.  I propose that a 
ceteris paribus clause be viewed not as part of the antecedent of a conditional but, rather, 
as part of the conditional operator itself.  In this paper, I shall treat the presence of a 
ceteris paribus clause as a kind of logical or grammatical feature – like the presence of a 
subjunctive verb – that is correlated with a distinctive sort of conditional operator. 
 
Although I do not regard ceteris paribus conditionals as vacuously true, I do not 
expect my semantic analysis to necessarily reassure those who do – at least not by itself.  
Those who believe that ceteris paribus conditionals are devoid of substantial content may 
take a similar attitude toward the very parameter that my analysis will exploit.  They are 
free to do so.  However, I think it is a parameter that is here to stay whether or not we 
decide to use it in the semantic analysis of ceteris paribus conditionals.  It is the relation 
of comparative normalcy. 
 
 We are quite comfortable assenting to things like ‘it is more normal for a human 
to have 46 chromosomes than 47’ and ‘it is more normal for me to have breakfast at 
home than at work’.  It is this comparative normalcy relation that will be invoked in my 
proposed semantic analysis of ceteris paribus conditionals.  Naturally, it will be the 
comparative normalcy of entire possible worlds, and not limited states of affairs, that will 
be at issue.  The idea that possible worlds or states of affairs might be ordered to reflect a 
relation of comparative normalcy is not new – though it is not exactly commonplace 
either.  The idea has been explored in connection with conditional logics for defeasible 
reasoning (Delgrande, 1987, Boutilier, 1994, Boutilier and Becher, 1995), in connection 
with subjunctive conditionals (Gundersen, 2004) and in connection with conditional 
analyses of causation (Menzies, 2004).   
 
 Consider the conditional ‘If it had not rained today, then we would have gone to 
the cricket’.  David Lewis (1973a, 1973b) has suggested that a bare subjunctive 
conditional such as this means something like: In any possible world in which the 
weather is fine and which resembles the actual world as much as the weather being fine 
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permits it to, we go to the cricket.  Alternately, the most similar worlds in which it is not 
raining and we go to the cricket are more similar than the most similar worlds in which it 
is not raining and we do not go to the cricket. 
 
 Consider the conditional ‘If it had not rained today, then other things being equal 
we would have gone to the cricket’.  I suggest that a ceteris paribus conditional such as 
this means something like: In any possible world in which the weather is fine and which 
is as normal, from the perspective of the actual world, as the weather being fine permits it 
to be, we go to the cricket.  Alternately, the most normal worlds in which it is not raining 
and we go to the cricket are more normal than the most normal worlds in which it is not 
raining and we don’t go to the cricket.  A ceteris paribus clause indicates that the worlds 
relative to which a subjunctive conditional is evaluated are to be selected on the basis of 
their normalcy and not their similarity. 
 
 A ceteris paribus conditional and its bare subjunctive counterpart may well 
diverge in truth value.  Suppose that our only viable means of transportation to the cricket 
is the train and that, unbeknownst to me, the trains are not running as a result of a serious 
mechanical fault.  In this case the bare subjunctive conditional ‘If it had not rained today 
we would have gone to the cricket’ will be false.  Since the trains are not running at the 
actual world, the trains are not running at all those fine weather worlds that resemble the 
actual world as much as the fine weather permits them to.  Plausibly, at some of these 
worlds at least, we are unable to go to the cricket. 
 
 In contrast, the ceteris paribus conditional ‘If it had not rained today, then other 
things being equal we would have gone to the cricket’ could still be true.  Even though 
the trains are not running at the actual world, those fine weather worlds in which the 
trains are running are arguably more normal than those fine weather worlds in which the 
trains are not.  At the actual world, it is more normal for the trains to run than for all the 
trains to be stopped.  Therefore, the trains are running at all those fine weather worlds 
that are as normal, from the perspective of the actual world, as the fine weather permits 
them to be.  Plausibly, at all these worlds, we go to the cricket.  While the no-rain, no-
 5
train worlds outrank the no-rain, train worlds with respect to comparative similarity, the 
opposite is true when comparative normalcy is our measure.  This is what accounts for 
the divergence in truth value between the bare subjunctive conditional and its ceteris 
paribus counterpart. 
 
 In terms of comparative world normalcy, Sober’s version of the principle of 
natural selection has the following truth condition: The most normal worlds in which (a) 
organisms possessing trait T are better able to survive and reproduce than organisms 
possessing trait T′, (b) T and T′ are heritable traits and (c) the proportion of organisms 
possessing trait T increases, are more normal than the most normal worlds in which (a) 
organisms possessing trait T are better able to survive and reproduce than organisms 
possessing trait T′, (b) T and T′ are heritable traits and (d) the proportion of organisms 
possessing trait T decreases or stagnates. 
 
 One might complain, at this point, that judgments of comparative normalcy are 
context sensitive – that is, that the truth value of at least some comparative normalcy 
judgments will be sensitive to features of the context of utterance.  This is doubtless true 
– but it is all for the better, since ceteris paribus conditionals are also context sensitive.  If 
my analysis is on the right track, then the contextual factors to which ceteris paribus 
conditionals are responsive are the very same as the contextual factors to which 
comparative normalcy judgments are responsive.  It is the job of a semantic analysis to 
respect context sensitivity and not to eradicate it. 
 
II. SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS AND COMPARATIVE SIMILARITY 
 
Lewis, in providing his semantic analysis of subjunctive conditionals, supplements the 
standard possible world semantic toolkit with the notion of comparative world similarity.  
He elucidates this relation graphically.  Let w be the index world to which all other 
worlds are being compared.  If we visualise possible worlds arranged in space with 
proximity serving as a metaphor for similarity, then we can imagine a series of concentric 
spheres radiating out from w – each representing a class of worlds that resemble w 
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equally.  This is the mathematician’s sense of sphere – a locus of points (in three-
dimensional space) equidistant from a single point.  Now think of a sphere as solid rather 
than hollow – containing not just the worlds that compose its surface, but also those that 
fall inside it.  This is how Lewis intends that the term be used.  For Lewis the system of 
spheres associated with an index world can be well-ordered by inclusion or ‘size’ – a 
constraint he terms nesting. 
 
According to Lewis, the smallest nonempty sphere in a system will be a singleton 
set containing the index world.  Presumably no world resembles the index world more 
closely or as closely as it resembles itself.  The largest sphere in a system will be the set 
containing all the worlds accessible from the index world.  This is intended to be the very 
same accessibility relation that governs the quantificational range of necessity and 
possibility operators.  The worlds accessible from a world w are those worlds that are 
possible from the perspective of w.  Say that a sphere around a world w permits a 
sentence ϕ just in case it contains ϕ-worlds. 
 
Lewis introduces two conditional operators → and → to be read respectively 
as ‘If __ were the case, then … would be the case’ and ‘If __ were the case, then … 
might be the case’ (see Lewis, 1973b, pp1-2)  Equipped with the notion of comparative 
similarity, the truth conditions for the two types of subjunctive conditional can be given 
as follows: 
 ϕ → ψ is true at a world w
 
iff there exists a ϕ-permitting sphere of similarity 
around w in which all the ϕ-worlds are also ψ-worlds.  
 ϕ → ψ is true at a world w iff in all ϕ-permitting spheres of similarity around 
w, there exists a (ϕ ∧ ψ)-world. 
Lewis allows for one exception: Despite the fact that its truth condition has the form of an 
existential quantification over spheres, ϕ → ψ should be deemed vacuously true at w if 
ϕ is necessarily false – that is, if there is no ϕ-permitting sphere around w.  This allows 
us to maintain that subjunctive conditionals are logically weaker than strict conditionals.  
That is, that (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ).  A strict conditional ϕ → ψ, of course, is true at a 
world just in case all accessible ϕ-worlds are ψ-worlds. 
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 Subjunctive conditionals, like strict conditionals, involve quantification over 
possible worlds.  However, while strict conditionals are associated with a single sphere of 
accessibility governing their quantificational range, subjunctive conditionals are 
associated with a set of spheres of accessibility, each governing one possible 
quantificational range.  Subjunctive conditionals might, then, be described as variably 
strict (see Lewis, 1973, pp13-19).  A subjunctive conditional will quantify over as large a 
sphere as it needs to in order to accommodate the truth of its antecedent (assuming this 
can be done). 
 
According to Lewis, sphere systems must focus upon, or radiate from, the world 
to which they are assigned – that is {w} is guaranteed to be the smallest nonempty sphere 
around w.  Lewis terms this constraint centering.  (It is technically convenient to include 
the empty set amongst the spheres around an index world.  Evidently, this makes no 
difference to the truth conditions for subjunctive conditionals). Some of Lewis’ 
commentators have expressed misgivings about the strength of the centering constraint 
(Bowie, 1979, Nozick, 1981, pp176, 690, 681, Gundersen, 2004).  Amongst other things, 
it lands us with some unusual logical consequences.  With centering in place, for 
instance, a subjunctive conditional with a true antecedent and a true consequent is 
guaranteed to be true.  
 
In a weakly centered system of spheres, while the index world remains an element 
of the smallest nonempty sphere around itself, it is no longer the sole element.  Further 
worlds are permitted to infiltrate.  If we supplant centering with weak centering, a 
subjunctive conditional ϕ → ψ with a true antecedent and consequent need not be true – 
rather it will retain some modal strength.  This conditional will be true at a (ϕ ∧ ψ)-world 
just in case all of the ϕ-worlds in the smallest or innermost nonempty sphere of similarity 
around w are also ψ-worlds.  I take no stand here on whether the stronger or the weaker 
centering constraint is preferable.  I raise this issue simply as a way of finessing the 
transition to my own semantics for ceteris paribus conditionals. 
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III. FROM IMPERATIVE CONDITIONALS TO CETERIS PARIBUS 
CONDITIONALS 
 
In a centered system of spheres, the index world enjoys a uniquely privileged position as 
the sole member of the smallest nonempty sphere.  In a weakly centered system of 
spheres, the index world shares this particular privilege with a range of further worlds.  
Clearly, there is a third possibility.  In a decentered system of spheres, the index world 
enjoys no privileges whatsoever.  In a decentered system, the index world does not even 
feature as an element of the smallest nonempty sphere.  While out of place in the 
modelling of bare subjunctive conditionals, Lewis suggested that such systems might find 
a home in the semantic analysis of certain other kinds of conditional – he chose 
imperative conditionals as his example. 
 
 When evaluating a conditional such as ‘If Jesse robbed the bank, then he ought to 
return the loot and confess’ we are still interested in the properties of possible worlds in 
which Jesse robs the bank.  But, rather than selecting these worlds on the basis of the 
extent to which they resemble the actual world, we would be better served by examining 
the degree to which they exemplify some moral ideal.  The content of this conditional, 
according to Lewis, is that the best worlds in which Jesse robs the bank are worlds in 
which he then confesses and returns the loot.  Similar suggestions have been made by 
Bengt Hansson (1969) and Bas Van Fraassen (1973).  
 
 If a sphere system is intended to represent the comparative goodness of possible 
worlds from the perspective of the index world, then there is no reason to expect that the 
system will be centered or even weakly centered.  Indeed, these conditions will only be 
met on the proviso that the index world estimates itself to be perfect.  Ceteris paribus 
conditionals and imperative conditionals appear to have a good deal in common.  Both, I 
think, implicate some implicit idealisation of the world at which they are to be evaluated.  
However, in the case of a ceteris paribus conditional, this is not a romantic idealisation so 
much as a simplifying one – a practice in which we, surely, just as often indulge.  
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 When evaluating a conditional such as ‘If the supply of oil were to decrease while 
demand remains constant, then ceteris paribus the price of oil would rise’ we are 
interested in the properties of certain possible worlds in which the supply of oil decreases 
while the demand remains constant.  What the ceteris paribus clause does, I have 
suggested, is to signal that these worlds are to be selected on the basis of their normalcy 
or simplicity rather than their similarity to the actual world.  The content of the 
conditional is that the most normal worlds in which the supply of oil decreases while the 
demand remains constant are worlds in which the price increases. 
 
It would be interesting to compare the notion of a normal world with the idea of 
an idealised model of a phenomenon, as used across the breadth of sciences2.  In the same 
way that normal worlds can be ranked according to their degree of normalcy, certain 
kinds of models can be ranked according to their degree of idealisation.  Various models 
of projectile motion provide one good example (see Shaffer, 2001, pp39-41, Arthur and 
Fenster, 1969, chap. 7).  Furthermore, the relationship between ceteris paribus 
conditionals and the goings-on in idealised models has been noted (Cartwright, 1983, 
1999, Pietroski and Rey, 1995, Menzies, 2004).  I won’t pursue this comparison further 
here.  Sticking with a widespread custom in deontic logic, I will say nothing precise 
about the significance of the world orderings to which I appeal.   
 
I introduce two ceteris paribus conditional operators → and → to be read 
respectively as ‘If__ were the case, then ceteris paribus … would be the case’ and ‘If __ 
were the case, then ceteris paribus … might be the case’.  The truth conditions for the two 
types of ceteris paribus conditional can be given as follows: 
ϕ → ψ is true at a world w
 
iff there exists a ϕ-permitting sphere of normalcy 
associated with w in which all the ϕ-worlds are also ψ-worlds.  
 ϕ → ψ is true at a world w iff in all ϕ-permitting spheres of normalcy 
associated with w there exists a (ϕ ∧ ψ)-world. 
                                                  
2
 The widespread use of idealisations in scientific explanation and prediction has been emphasised by 
Cartwright (1983, 1999) and Laymon (1985, 1989) amongst others.  I would suggest that the use of 
idealisations is just as widespread throughout ‘folk’ explanation and prediction. 
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Once again, we need to add the proviso that ϕ → ψ should be deemed vacuously true 
and ϕ → ~ψ vacuously false at a world w in case there is no ϕ-permitting sphere of 
normalcy associated with w. 
 
The failure of weak centering means that a number of notable inference patterns 
will fail to preserve truth in the logic of ceteris paribus conditionals.  The following 
notable patterns, all of which are perfectly valid in the logic of subjunctive conditionals, 
are fallacious in the logic of ceteris paribus conditionals: 
 
ϕ    ~ψ    ϕ       
ϕ → ψ   ϕ → ψ   ~ψ           
ψ    ~ϕ    ~(ϕ → ψ) 
       Modus Ponens         Modus Tollens              Refutation 
The following notable patterns, however, remain valid:  
       ϕ → ψ    ϕ → ψ         
      (ψ ∧ ϕ) → χ   ψ → χ    
      ψ → χ    ϕ → χ  
    Restricted Hypothetical Syllogism     Weakening the Consequent  
The logic of ceteris paribus conditionals will be explored in some detail in the final 
section. 
 
Not only will world rankings based upon comparative goodness fail, in general, to 
centre upon the index world, they will fail, in general, to centre upon any single world.  
That is to say, the smallest nonempty sphere in a comparative goodness ordering will 
typically contain more than just one world.  After all, why should a single possible world 
outshine all others?  Intuitively, there are innumerable facts about any given world that 
simply do not bear upon its goodness.  Similarly, one would presume that there are 
countless minutiae about most possible worlds that do not affect their normalcy in any 
way.  The worlds that comprise the smallest nonempty sphere in a comparative normalcy 
ordering will differ in just these irrelevant respects.  Comparative normalcy orderings, 
then, will typically centre upon a non-singleton class of possible worlds. 
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 One might think that the correct ranking of worlds with respect to comparative 
goodness is unchanged from the perspective of any given world – that is, every world 
gets assigned the one true comparative goodness ordering.  Conventional wisdom 
regarding the fact/value gap would tend to support this supposition.  Plausibly, what 
ought to be the case does not vary as a function of what is the case.  However, if one 
held, say, a divine command theory of goodness, according to which what is good is 
simply that which is dictated to be good by an appropriate deity, then one may well take a 
different view.   
 
For a divine command theorist, the correct ranking of worlds with respect to 
comparative goodness would indeed vary from world to world reflecting the incumbent 
deity’s preferences. (Those worlds without an appropriate deity would, presumably, 
receive an empty or nihilistic sphere system.)  The best worlds, from the standpoint of w, 
will be those worlds at which the preferences of the deity incumbent at w are all satisfied 
(as far as this is possible).  There will be one comparative goodness ordering 
corresponding to every possible set of divine preferences.  Similarly, the correct ranking 
of worlds with respect to comparative normalcy will, intuitively, vary from world to 
world – but with explanatory generalisations or tendencies taking over the role of divine 
preferences.  The most normal worlds, from the standpoint of w, will be those worlds at 
which the generalisations or tendencies that play an important explanatory role at the 
actual world are all exceptionless (as far as this is possible). 
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Consider the following four figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If we were to order these figures with respect to their similarity to (a), then plausibly we 
would obtain the following ranking (from most similar to least similar): (a), (b), (d), (c).  
((b) has 24 squares in common with (a), (d) has 17 and (c) has 16).  If, on the other hand, 
we were to order these figures with respect to their faithfulness to the pattern suggested 
by (a) (their ‘comparative normalcy’ from the perspective of (a)), then plausibly we 
would obtain the following ranking (from most faithful to least faithful): (b), (a), (d), (c).  
We can form a defeasible generalisation about the distribution of squares in (a) that 
happens to describe, without exception, the distribution of squares in (b). 
 
 Similarly, if we were to order the figures with respect to their similarity to (d) we 
would obtain the ordering (d), (c), (a), (b) and if we were to order them with respect to 
their faithfulness to the pattern established by (d) we would obtain the ordering (c), (d), 
(a), (b).  While each of (a), (b), (c) and (d) is associated with its own unique comparative 
similarity ordering, both (a) and (b) share a comparative normalcy ordering as do (c) and 
(d).  They serve to ‘establish’ the same recognisable pattern.  The standards of 
comparative normalcy imposed by these figures are not, then, absolute.  They are, 
however, less relative or more robust than the standards of comparative similarity.  
a) b) 
c) d) 
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When dealing with objects more complex than these figures, it is possible to 
generalise about the exceptions to generalisations.  Consider, for instance, the 
generalisations ‘Most peacocks are blue’ and ‘Most albino peacocks are white’.  These 
two generalisations can, of course, be made simultaneously exceptionless – namely, by 
emptying the extension of albino peacocks.  However, the second generalisation will still 
leave its mark upon a comparative world normalcy ordering.  It is as if a deity were to 
issue the following commands: ‘All peacocks are to be blue’ and ‘All albino peacocks are 
to be white’.  The second command is not superfluous.  The worlds that most faithfully 
satisfy the deity’s preferences will be worlds in which all peacocks are blue and there are 
no albino peacocks at all.  However, with respect to worlds that do contain albino 
peacocks, those in which all such peacocks are white will better satisfy the deity’s 
preferences than those in which they are not.  So it is when normalcy rather than divine 
preference is our measure. 
 
The idea that standards of normalcy are world relative is related to a view 
expressed in section I – namely, that ceteris paribus conditionals can be used to express 
substantial claims about the world.  If standards of normalcy were indifferent to 
hypothetical variation in the nature of the world then, given my semantic analysis, so too 
would the truth of ceteris paribus conditionals be indifferent to hypothetical variation in 
the nature of the world.  In this case, ceteris paribus conditionals could never be 
contingent.  
 
Craig Boutilier (1994) proposes a possible world semantics for what he terms 
‘normative’ conditionals – that is, conditionals of the form ‘If __, then normally …’.  He 
suggests that a normative conditional should be deemed true at a possible world w iff for 
every possible world at which the antecedent is true and the consequent false, there is a 
more normal possible world at which (i) antecedent and consequent are both true and (ii) 
at all possible worlds that are more normal still, if the antecedent is true, then the 
consequent is true (Boutilier, 1994, pp103).  Boutilier’s semantic apparatus is more 
austere than mine, consisting of a class of possible worlds and a single ordering relation 
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upon that class intended to represent a relation of comparative normalcy3.  As such, his 
analysis depends for its success upon the assumption that standards of normalcy are not 
themselves world relative. 
 
It is interesting to note that Boutilier does not appear to regard normative 
conditionals as expressing substantial claims about the world (Boutilier, 1994, pp96, 110-
116).  For Boutilier, normative conditionals serve primarily as a vehicle for expressing a 
kind of expectation or reasoning preference – a default or defeasible willingness to 
accept the consequent given the antecedent.  These assumptions could help to motivate a 
semantic framework in which standards of normalcy are world absolute – but they strike 
me as dubious.  When I say ‘If I were to drop this glass, then normally it would break’, I 
am telling you something (contingent) about the properties of the glass – not just 
something about my reasoning preferences.  Furthermore, although there is some relation 
between the endorsement of a conditional such as this and a default willingness to draw 
certain inferences, I am not inclined to think that the relationship is straightforward.  
Having said this, I should point out that Boutilier’s primary concern is to provide a 
semantic analysis of defeasible inference rules and that his theory can be assessed in this 
light quite independently of the issues I have raised here.   
 
One must be careful not to place unrealistic demands upon a semantic analysis.  
The purpose of my comparative normalcy semantics for ceteris paribus conditionals is 
not to help us determine the truth value of particular conditionals – at least not on its own.  
No one would expect a comparative goodness semantics for imperative conditionals to 
provide genuine moral guidance – and the situation with my analysis is no different.  A 
comparative goodness semantics for imperative conditionals, it might be said, is no 
substitute for a genuine theory of what goodness is.  By the same token, a comparative 
                                                  
3
 Boutilier, in a sense, limits himself to the resources of standard possible world semantics.  He introduces a 
reflexive, transitive accessibility relation upon the class of possible worlds, to be understood as a 
comparative normalcy ordering.  That is, aRb means that b is at least as normal a world as a (Boutilier, 
1995, pp96-97).  He then introduces two modal operators – one that quantifies, at a given world, over all 
equally or more normal worlds (accessible worlds) and one that quantifies over all less normal worlds 
(inaccessible worlds) giving us, in effect, a bimodal logic in which both modal operators are governed by 
the same accessibility relation.  Boutilier proceeds to define his normative conditional operator in terms of 
these two unary operators. 
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normalcy semantics for ceteris paribus conditionals is no substitute for a genuine theory 
of what normalcy is – and, aside from a few suggestive remarks, this is a matter upon 
which I have remained silent4.   
 
Much the same point can be made regarding the standard possible world 
semantics for necessity and possibility operators (see Kripke, 1980, pp19, footnote 18).  
Possible world semantics does not tell us what is possible and what isn’t.  But it is, of 
course, often used to clarify just what is at stake in such disputes.  Similarly, my 
proposed comparative world normalcy semantics may prove useful in clarifying precisely 
what is at stake in disputes over particular ceteris paribus conditionals.  
 
Furthermore, although my comparative world normalcy semantics cannot settle 
disputes over particular ceteris paribus conditionals, it can settle matters of logic – at 
least, in combination with a little reflection upon the formal features of comparative 
normalcy.  My proposed semantics has the potential to explain and motivate, in a unified 
way, the logical principles to which ceteris paribus conditionals are intuitively subject.  
As such, it offers an alternative to piecemeal theorising about the logic of ceteris paribus 
conditionals.  This is perhaps the most significant benefit of a semantic analysis.  In the 
concluding section, I provide technical details of the logic to which ceteris paribus 
conditionals, and various related operators, are subject and show just how this logic 
emerges from my analysis. 
 
IV. THE LOGIC OF CETERIS PARIBUS CONDITIONALS 
 
I shall begin this final section by setting things up in a purely formal fashion.  The formal 
language L to be interpreted includes in its vocabulary countably many sentence letters 
(A, B, C …), the sentential constants T and ⊥ and punctuation.  It also contains the truth 
                                                  
4
 A few more suggestive remarks: When it comes to normalcy, I am inclined to think that both frequentist 
accounts (Gundersen, 2004) and teleological accounts (Millikan, 1984, pp5, 33-34) are on the wrong track.  
I suggest that one fruitful, if somewhat elliptical, way to shed light upon the nature of normalcy is by 
investigating the utility of idealised models in prediction and explanation and, in particular, the conditions 
under which explanation and prediction can successfully proceed in the absence of complete theories. 
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functional operators (~, ∧, ∨, ⊃, ≡), the special operators (→, →, →, , ) and four 
more sentential operators to be introduced shortly.  The sentences of L are built up using 
the standard recursive clauses for operators and punctuation.  The metalanguage, in 
which the truth conditions for L sentences are described, is an extensional, first order 
language.  For ease, I will use the same symbols for the truth functional operators of this 
language.  I will use lower case Greek letters as metalinguistic sentence variables.  
 
Language L is interpreted relative to a nonempty set of indices I and a function 
S(x) assigning a system of spheres to each x ∈ I.  A sphere is simply a set of indices and 
a system of such spheres is simply a set of such sets meeting certain structural conditions.   
I define an associated interpretation function Ix(y) which maps pairs of elements of I and 
sentences of L into the set {0, 1}.  An interpretation ℐ , then, is a triple < I, S(x), Ix(y)>.  
For all interpretations, Ix(T) = 1 and Ix(⊥)= 0 for any index x.  If Ii(ϕ) = 1, we can say that 
sentence ϕ holds at i under interpretation ℐ .  A sentence ϕ is valid under an 
interpretation ℐ  just in case it holds at every index – that is, just in case ∀x ∈ I, Ix(ϕ) = 
1.   A sentence ϕ might be described as semantically valid or valid simpliciter just in case 
it is valid under all permissible interpretations. 
 
The function Ix(y) will meet the following conditions:  
  
Ii(~ϕ) = 1 iff  ~ (Ii(ϕ) = 1) 
Ii(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 iff (Ii(ϕ) = 1) ∧ (I i(ψ) = 1) 
Ii(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1 iff (Ii(ϕ) = 1) ∨ (I i(ψ) = 1) 
Ii(ϕ ⊃ ψ) = 1 iff (Ii(ϕ) = 1) ⊃ (I i(ψ) = 1) 
Ii(ϕ ≡ ψ) = 1 iff (Ii(ϕ) = 1) ≡ (I i(ψ) = 1) 
Ii(ϕ) = 1 iff ∀S ∈ S(i), ∀x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1 
Ii(ϕ) = 1 iff ∃S ∈ S(i), ∃x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1 
Ii(ϕ → ψ) = 1 iff ∀S ∈ S(i), ∀x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ ⊃ ψ) = 1 
I
 i(ϕ → ψ)  iff ∃S ∈ S(i), (∃x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1 ∧ ∀y ∈ S, Iy(ϕ ⊃ ψ) = 1)  
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∨ (~∃S ∈ S(i), ∃x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1) 
[ϕ → ψ]i iff ∀S ∈ S(i), (∃x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1 ⊃ ∃y ∈ S, Iy(ϕ ⊃ ψ) = 1) 
   ∧ (∃S ∈ S(i), ∃x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1) 
The additional disjunct added to the truth conditions for ϕ → ψ and the additional 
conjunct added to the truth conditions for ϕ → ψ capture Lewis’s provisos about 
impossible antecedents. 
 
This purely formal characterisation obviously leaves it quite neutral just what I, 
Ix(y) and S(x) are to represent.  Different thoughts about this give rise to different 
interpretations of L.  On my intended interpretation, I is the totality of possible worlds, 
Ii(ϕ) = 1 iff ϕ is true at world i and S(x) is the function assigning to each world the 
system of spheres of normalcy associated with that world.  That is, every S ∈ S(i) 
represents the set of possible worlds that satisfies some given standard of normalcy from 
the perspective of world i.  Given this intended interpretation, I have argued that → and 
→ can be read as ceteris paribus conditionals. 
 
We can now introduce a pair of ‘inner’ modal operators (,) to serve as the 
counterparts of the ‘outer’ modal operators (,): 
Ii(ϕ) = 1 iff ∃S ∈ S(i), ∀x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1 
Ii(ϕ) = 1 iff ∀S ∈ S(i), (S = Λ ∨ ∃x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1) 
While ϕ holds at an index i just in case ϕ holds throughout all spheres assigned to i, ϕ 
holds at an index i iff ϕ holds throughout some sphere assigned to i.  Given my intended 
interpretation,  can be read as ‘__ would normally be the case’ and  as ‘__ could 
normally be the case’ or ‘It would not be abnormal for __ to be the case’.  Call these 
normalcy operators. 
 
We can also introduce two binary sentential operators < and ≤ as follows:  
Ii(ϕ < ψ) = 1 iff ∃S ∈ S(i), (∃x ∈ S, Ix(ϕ) = 1 ∧ ∀y ∈ S, ~ (Iy(ψ) = 1)) 
Ii(ϕ ≤ ψ) = 1 iff ∀S ∈ S(i), (∃x ∈ S, Ix(ψ) = 1 ⊃ ∃y ∈ S, Iy(ϕ) = 1) 
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ϕ < ψ holds at an index i iff there is a sphere S in S(i) such that S permits ϕ but not ψ.   
ϕ ≤ ψ holds at an index i iff for all spheres S in S(i), if S permits ψ then S permits ϕ.  
Given my intended interpretation, ≤ can be read as ‘__ would be no less normal than 
…’ and < can be read as ‘__ would be more normal than …’.  Call these comparative 
normalcy operators.  
 
Both the normalcy and comparative normalcy operators can be defined in terms of 
ceteris paribus conditionals (and possibility) by exploiting the following equivalences: 
ϕ ≡ (T → ϕ) 
ϕ ≡ (T → ϕ) 
(ϕ ≤ ψ) ≡ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) → ϕ) ∨ ~ψ 
(ϕ < ψ) ≡ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) → ~ψ) ∧ ϕ 
We can define possibility as follows: 
 ϕ ≡ ϕ → ϕ  
 
Ceteris paribus conditionals can also be defined in terms of the comparative 
normalcy operators (and possibility) by exploiting the equivalences: 
 (ϕ → ψ) ≡ ((ϕ ∧ ψ) < (ϕ ∧ ~ψ)) ∨ ~ϕ 
 (ϕ → ψ) ≡ ((ϕ ∧ ψ) ≤ (ϕ ∧ ~ψ)) ∧ ϕ 
We can also define possibility as follows: 
 ϕ ≡ ϕ < ⊥ 
The claim that if ϕ were the case, then ceteris paribus ψ would be the case is equivalent 
to the claim that it would be more normal for ϕ and ψ to both be true than for ϕ to be true 
and ψ false (or ϕ is impossible)’.  The claim that if ϕ were the case, then ceteris paribus 
ψ might be the case is equivalent to the claim that it would be no less normal for ϕ and ψ 
to be true than for ϕ to be true and ψ to be false (and ϕ is possible)’.   
 
There are three compulsory conditions that a function S(x) taking indices to sets 
of sets of indices must meet in order to qualify as a sphere system assignment function.  
The first condition – nesting, requires that ∀x ∈ I, ∀X, Y ∈ S(x), X ⊆ Y ∨ Y ⊆ X.  The 
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second and third are closure under unions and (nonempty) intersections respectively: 
∀x ∈ I, ∀X ⊆ S(x), ∪X ∈ S(x)) and ∀x ∈ I, ∀X ⊆ S(x), (X ≠ Λ ⊃ ∩X ∈ S(x)).  
 
These compulsory conditions furnish us with two axiom schemata: 
(i) ((ϕ ≤ ψ) ∧ (ψ ≤ χ))  ⊃ (ϕ ≤ χ)  
(ii) (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∨  (ψ ≤ ϕ) 
The content of these principles is most perspicuous when they are expressed in terms of 
comparative normalcy – they jointly express the fact that comparative normalcy is a weak 
ordering.   
 
The following table lists a series of optional constraints that might be placed upon 
a sphere assignment function.  Each constraint, save for the first, is listed by Lewis 
(1973b, pp121).  Constraints are listed along with the formal semantic postulates that 
capture them and the characteristic axiom schemata validated when those postulates are 
implemented: 
 
 
Constraint Postulate Axiom Schema           
 
Triviality ∀x ∈ I, S(x) = Λ ⊥ ≤ T 
 
Significance ∀x ∈ I, S(x) ≠ Λ T < ⊥  
 
Total reflexivity ∀x ∈ I, x ∈ ∪S(x) ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
 
Weak centering ∀x ∈ I, x ∈ ∩(S(x) - Λ) ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
 
Centering ∀x ∈ I, {x} ∈ S(x) ϕ ⊃ ϕ     
 
Local uniformity ∀x ∈ I, ∀y ∈ ∪S(x), ∪S(x) = ∪S(y)  ϕ ⊃ ϕ   
     
Uniformity ∀x, y ∈ I, ∪S(x) = ∪S(y)  ϕ ⊃ ϕ  
 
Local absoluteness ∀x ∈ I, ∀y ∈ ∪S(y), S(x) = S(y)  ϕ ≤ ψ ⊃ (ϕ ≤ ψ)  
   
Absoluteness ∀x, y ∈ I, S(x) = S(y)  ϕ < ψ ⊃ (ϕ < ψ) 
 
  
 Axioms linked by brackets are both yielded by either of the corresponding 
postulates.  The conditions listed here are not logically independent.  Given the 
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compulsory constraints upon S(x), centering implies weak centering, which implies total 
reflexivity which, in turn, implies significance.  Triviality implies absoluteness which 
implies local absoluteness and uniformity, and uniformity implies local uniformity.   
 
 I include the first constraint – triviality – since this is the constraint to which 
sceptics who regard ceteris paribus conditionals as vacuously true must subscribe – 
provided, at any rate, that they accept my semantic analysis.  Given my intended 
interpretation, one can easily confirm that, under this condition, any sentence of the form 
ϕ → ψ will be true at all possible worlds and any sentence of the form ϕ → ψ will be 
true at none.  One need not probe the resultant logic too deeply to unearth principles that 
are intuitively bizarre.  I think it is quite appropriate to use the counterintuitive nature of 
the principles as part of a case against scepticism about ceteris paribus conditionals.  
However, as I’ve stated, I’m not concerned to refute the sceptics here. 
  
On my intended interpretation of I and S(x),  and  can be read as 
metaphysical necessity and possibility respectively.  If we suppose, for ease, that the 
logic governing possibility and necessity is the modal logic S5, it follows immediately 
that S(x) should be subject to the total reflexivity and local uniformity constraints.  The 
accessibility relation R governing the quantificational range of the necessity and 
possibility operators is defined as follows: ∀x, y xRy iff ∃S ∈ S(x), y ∈ S.  The necessity 
and possibility operators quantify, at a world w, over those worlds that appear in some 
sphere of normalcy assigned to w.  If R is to be reflexive – ∀x xRx – then S(x) must be 
constrained by total reflexivity.  If R is to be, in addition, transitive and symmetric – ∀x, 
y, z ((xRy ∧ yRz) ⊃ xRz) and ∀x, y (xRy ⊃ yRx) – then S(x) must also be constrained 
by local uniformity.   
 
The weak centering constraint upon S(x) corresponds, given my intended 
interpretation, to the presumption that every world estimates itself to be maximally 
normal, while the full centering constraint upon S(x) corresponds to the presumption that 
every world estimates itself to be uniquely maximally normal.  As I have argued, both of 
these presumptions are untenable.  Thus, S(x) should be free from both centering and 
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weak centering.  It is intuitively correct that ϕ ⊃ ϕ should fail to be semantically valid.  
The claim that ϕ would normally be the case does not logically imply that ϕ is in fact the 
case. 
 
 Given my intended interpretation, the absoluteness constraint upon S(x) 
corresponds to the presumption that every possible world imposes the very same standards 
of normalcy, while the local absoluteness constraint corresponds to the presumption that 
every world that is possible from the perspective of world w imposes the very same 
standards of normalcy as w.  As I have argued, these presumptions are also untenable and 
both constraints should be relaxed in the case of S(x).  It is intuitively correct that 
(ϕ ≤ ψ) ⊃ (ϕ ≤ ψ) and (ϕ < ψ) ⊃ (ϕ < ψ) should not be valid.  The claim that 
ψ would be at least as normal as ϕ does not logically imply that it is necessarily the case 
that ψ would be at least as normal as ϕ.  The claim that ϕ would be more normal than ψ 
does not logically imply that it is necessarily the case that ϕ would be more normal than 
ψ. 
 
Lewis’s list of semantic restrictions is, of course, far from exhaustive.  Consider 
the following constraint that I shall term robustness: ∀x, y ∈ I, (∀S ∈ S(x), S = Λ ∨ 
y ∈ S) ⊃ S(y) = S(x).  This constraint upon S(x), weaker than both local absoluteness and 
centering, corresponds on my intended interpretation to the presumption that, if a world i 
is estimated to be maximally normal by a world j – if i is a member of every nonempty 
sphere of normalcy associated with j – then i and j will share the same standards of 
normalcy.  That is, if a possible world perfectly exemplifies any world’s ideals of 
normalcy, then it will share these ideals and, thus, perfectly exemplify its own ideals of 
normalcy.  Robustness does some justice to the intuition, explored briefly in the previous 
section, that standards of normalcy, while not entirely aloof from the contingent nature of 
the world, are insensitive with respect to certain contingent differences.   
 
Two principles are jointly characteristic of robustness – namely, (ϕ ≤ ψ) ≡ 
(ϕ ≤ ψ) and (ϕ < ψ) ≡ (ϕ < ψ).  Robustness will also serve to validate the 
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equivalences (ϕ → ψ) ≡ (ϕ → ψ) and (ϕ → ψ) ≡ (ϕ → ψ).  These principles 
seem intuitively plausible.  The claim that ψ would be at least as normal as ϕ does seem 
logically equivalent to the claim that normally ψ would be at least as normal as ϕ.  
Similarly, the claim that ϕ would be more normal than ψ seems logically equivalent to 
the claim that normally ϕ would be more normal than ψ.  In both of these cases, the 
additional normalcy clause seems redundant.  My suggestion, then, is that the logic 
governing ceteris paribus conditionals is the logic generated by a system assignment 
function constrained by total reflexivity, local uniformity and robustness.  
 
Given this logic for ceteris paribus conditionals, we can derive a modal logic for 
the normalcy operators (,).  The accessibility relation R′ governing the 
quantificational range of the normalcy operators is defined as follows: ∀x, y xR′y iff 
∀S ∈ S(x) (S = Λ ∨ y ∈ S).  That is, the normalcy operators quantify, at a world w, over 
the worlds that appear in all nonempty spheres of normalcy assigned to w.  By total 
reflexivity R′ is serial – ∀w ∃x wR′x – and by robustness R′ is both transitive – ∀w, x, y 
(wR′x ∧ xR′y) ⊃ wR′y – and Euclidean – ∀w, x, y (wR′x ∧ wR′y) ⊃ xRy.  By the 
failure of weak centering, R′ is irreflexive – ~∀w wR′w – and by robustness and the 
failure of weak centering R′ is asymmetric – ~ (∀w, x (wR′x ⊃ xR′w)).  The distribution 
principle K: (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ ψ), holds for a completely unconstrained R′.  A serial 
R′ validates D: ϕ ⊃ ϕ, a transitive R′ validates 4: ϕ ⊃ ϕ and a Euclidean R′ 
validates 5: ϕ ⊃ ϕ.   
 
It is worth pointing out that a Euclidean R′ will also be shift reflexive – ∀w, x 
(wRx ⊃ xRx).  A serial and Euclidean R′ will also be dense – ∀w, x (wR′x ⊃ ∃y (wR′y 
∧ yR′x)).  Shift reflexivity validates the principle T: (ϕ ⊃ ϕ), and density validates 
the principle C4: ϕ ⊃ ϕ.   
 
The modal logic governing the normalcy operators will have as axioms all of the 
truth functional tautologies, all instances of the definition ϕ ≡ ~~ϕ and all instances 
of the following schemata: 
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(K)  (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ ψ) 
 (D)  ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
 (4)  ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
 (5)  ϕ ⊃ ϕ    
It will have two inference rules: 
(i) ⇒ ϕ, ⇒ ϕ ⊃ ψ 
 ⇒ ψ 
   Modus Ponens 
(ii) ⇒ ϕ          
 ⇒ ϕ 
   Normic Necessitation 
This is the modal logic KD45 – a logic that has been investigated as a possible deontic 
and doxastic logic.  
 
 I conclude by offering an axiomatisation for the full logic of ceteris paribus 
conditionals and all related operators.  The logic will include, as axioms, all of the truth 
functional tautologies, schemata defining the operators , , , , <, →, → and 
→ in terms of the operator ≤ (along with the truth functional operators), and all 
instances of the following schemata: 
 
(i) ((ϕ ≤ ψ) ∧ (ψ ≤ χ)) ⊃ (ϕ ≤ χ)  
(ii) (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∨  (ψ ≤ ϕ) 
(iii) ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
(iv) ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
(v) ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
(vi) (ϕ ≤ ψ) ≡ (ϕ ≤ ψ)  
(vii) (ϕ < ψ) ≡ (ϕ < ψ) 
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There will be two rules of inference: 
(i) ⇒ ϕ, ⇒ ϕ ⊃ ψ 
 ⇒ ψ 
 Modus Ponens 
(ii) for any n ≥ 1 
 ⇒ ϕ ⊃ (ψ1 ∨ … ∨ ψn) 
 ⇒ (ψ1 ≤ ϕ) ∨ … ∨ (ψn ≤ ϕ) 
  Rule for Comparative Normalcy 
Call this logic VTRU.  Following Lewis, V indicates a variably strict conditional logic 
and T, R and U represent total reflexivity, robustness and local uniformity respectively. 
 
 Demonstrating that VTRU is sound with respect to the proposed semantics is 
relatively straightforward.  As can be easily verified, all instances of schemata (i) – (vii) 
are valid under any interpretation with the total reflexivity, local uniformity and 
robustness constraints (along with nesting and closure under unions and intersections).  
Further, modus ponens and the rule for comparative normalcy clearly preserve validity – 
they will never take us from valid to non-valid sentences.  Therefore, there are no 
theorems provable in VTRU that are not validated by the proposed semantics.  VTRU is 
consistent – it does not prove ⊥ as a theorem.  Completeness is proved in the appendix. 
 
 I have suggested that ceteris paribus conditionals should be understood as a 
distinct species of variably strict conditional alongside subjunctive conditionals, 
imperative conditionals and others.  The content of a ceteris paribus conditional is 
essentially this: the most normal worlds in which antecedent and consequent jointly hold 
are more normal than the most normal worlds in which the antecedent holds and the 
consequent fails.  I have suggested further that VTRU is the logical system that emerges 
from this conception of the content of ceteris paribus conditionals, given a little careful 
reflection upon the relation of comparative normalcy.    
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APPENDIX: COMPLETENESS OF VTRU 
 
The following technique for proving completeness is a variant of the technique devised 
by Lewis (1973b, pp124-130) which draws, in turn, upon the work of Lemmon and Scott 
(see Lemmon, 1977, sections 2 and 3) and Makinson (1966).  We begin by constructing a 
canonical interpretation of language L.  Call a set of sentences Σ of L, consistent just in 
case it does not allow us to prove ⊥ in the logic VTRU.  Say that a set of sentences Σ is 
consistent with a sentence ϕ just in case Σ ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.  Say that a set of sentences 
is maximally consistent just in case it is consistent but not consistent with any sentence 
that is not already contained in it. 
 
 VTRU satisfies Lindenbaum’s Lemma.  That is, any consistent set of sentences 
can be extended into a maximally consistent set.  Proof  The countably many sentences of 
L can be numbered and ordered.  Call this sequence ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 ….  For any consistent set 
of sentences Σ0, let Σn+1 = Σn ∪ {ϕn} if Σn and ϕn are consistent and let Σn+1 = Σn 
otherwise.  Every set in this sequence is consistent.  Let Σ∞ be the union of all sets in this 
sequence. Σ∞ includes Σ0. Σ∞ is consistent.  If not, some finite subset of Σ∞ must be 
inconsistent.  But every finite subset of Σ∞ is included in some Σn contradicting the 
consistency of each Σn.  Σ∞ is maximally consistent.  If not, then it must be consistent 
with some sentence ϕn that is not included in it.  If Σ∞ is consistent with ϕn, then Σn must 
be consistent with ϕn, in which case Σ∞ will include ϕn.  QED 
 
 We construct the canonical interpretation of L as follows: I is the set of all sets of 
maximally consistent sets of sentences of L and Ii(ϕ) = 1 iff ϕ ∈ i.  That is, a sentence ϕ 
holds at an index i, under the canonical interpretation just in case ϕ is a member of i.  All 
and only the theorems of VTRU will be valid under the canonical interpretation of L.  
Proof  An index that did not contain a theorem of VTRU would be inconsistent with that 
theorem and, hence, inconsistent simpliciter, contrary to stipulation.  Thus, all theorems 
of VTRU are valid under the canonical interpretation of L.  If ϕ is not a theorem of 
 26
VTRU then ~ϕ is consistent, in which case {~ϕ} can be extended to a maximally 
consistent set – call it i.  Index i does not contain sentence ϕ.  Thus, no non-theorems of 
VTRU are valid under the canonical interpretation of L.  QED 
 
  Provided we can show that this canonical interpretation of L is a genuine 
interpretation meeting all requisite conditions, completeness will follow at once.  First, on 
the canonical interpretation, I is nonempty.  Proof The set of theorems of VTRU is a 
consistent set of sentences and can be expanded into a maximally consistent set which 
will belong to I. QED  Second, the canonical interpretation provides the correct truth 
conditions for the sentential constants and truth functional operators.  Proof  T is a 
theorem of VTRU.  Hence, T is a member of every maximally consistent set of sentences 
and, thus, true at every index under the canonical interpretation.  ⊥ is not a member of 
any maximally consistent sets of sentences.  Thus, it is not true at any index under the 
canonical interpretation. Ii(~ϕ) = 1 iff ~(Ii(ϕ) = 1) holds, since a maximal consistent set 
must, for any ϕ, contain either but not both of ϕ and ~ϕ.  If a maximally consistent set 
contained neither ϕ nor ~ϕ it would be inconsistent with both and thus inconsistent with 
(ϕ ∨ ~ϕ) – a theorem of VTRU – in which case it would be inconsistent simpliciter.  
Ii(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 iff (Ii(ϕ) = 1) ∧ (Ii(ψ) = 1) is true, since a maximally consistent set of 
sentences must contain every sentence that it implies in VTRU.  If it did not contain a 
sentence it implied, it would be inconsistent with a sentence it implied and thus 
inconsistent simpliciter.  These results can easily be extended to the other truth functional 
operators.  QED 
 
 The canonical interpretation of the function S(x) is constructed as follows: Call a 
set of sentences Σ characteristic of an index i just in case, (i) if a sentence ~ϕ is a 
member of i then ϕ is not a member of Σ and (ii) if a sentence ϕ is a member of Σ and 
ψ ≤ ϕ is a member of i then ψ is a member Σ.  These two conditions will not clash – 
that is, a sentence will never be included in Σ in accordance with (ii) and excluded from Σ 
in accordance with (i).  This is ensured by the fact that (ϕ ∧ (ψ ≤ ϕ)) ⊃ ψ is a 
theorem of VTRU and, thus, a member of every index i.   
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Call a set of sentences saturated just in case, for every sentence ϕ of L, it contains 
either ϕ or ~ϕ or both.  If a set of sentences Σ is characteristic for an index i then, 
provided it is nonempty, it will be saturated.  Proof Assume a set of sentences Σ 
characteristic for index i is nonempty and not saturated.  Since Σ is nonempty it must 
contain a sentence – call it ψ.  If neither ϕ nor ~ϕ are members of Σ, then neither 
(ϕ ≤ ψ) nor (~ϕ ≤ ψ)) can be members of i.  In this case, i must be inconsistent with a 
theorem of VTRU.  ψ ⊃ (ϕ ∨ ~ϕ) is a truth functional tautology which implies, by the 
rule for comparative normalcy, (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∨ (~ϕ ≤ ψ).  As a result, characteristic sets of 
sentences, provided they are nonempty, must be saturated. QED  
 
Characteristic sets of sentences are closed under single premise consequence in 
VTRU.  That is, if a set of sentences Σ, characteristic for an index i, contains a sentence 
ϕ and ϕ ⊃ ψ is a theorem of VTRU then Σ will also contain sentence ψ.  Proof If ϕ ⊃ ψ 
is a theorem of VTRU then, by the rule for comparative normalcy, ψ ≤ ϕ is a theorem 
of VTRU and, thus, a member of i.  If ϕ is a member of Σ and ψ ≤ ϕ is a member of i, 
then ψ is a member of Σ.  QED  Under the canonical interpretation, a sphere associated 
with an index i is a set of maximally consistent subsets of a characteristic set of i.  S(x) 
assigns to an index x the set of spheres, so defined, that are associated with it.  
 
 Under the canonical interpretation, the set of spheres assigned to an index by the 
function S(x) is nested.  Proof The sets that are characteristic for an index i are nested.  If 
not, then there are two sets Σ and Π characteristic of an index i, such that for two 
sentences ϕ and ψ, ϕ ∈ Σ, ϕ ∉ Π, ψ ∈ Π and ψ ∉ Σ.  It follows from this that neither 
ϕ ≤ ψ nor ψ ≤ ϕ will be members of i.  In this case i must be inconsistent with the 
VTRU theorem (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∨ (ψ ≤ ϕ) and hence inconsistent simpliciter.  If a set of 
sentences Σ is a subset of a set of sentences Π, then the set of maximally consistent 
subsets of Σ will be a subset of the set of maximally consistent subsets of Π.  If the sets 
characteristic of an index i are nested, then so too are the spheres associated with i.  
Therefore the set of spheres assigned to an index i is nested.  QED  
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 Under the canonical interpretation, the set of spheres assigned to an index i by the 
function S(x) is closed under unions and nonempty intersections.  Proof  The union Σ of 
any set of sets characteristic of an index i must itself be characteristic of i.  If not, then 
either (a) Σ must contain a sentence ϕ such that ~ϕ is a member of i or (b) Σ must 
contain a sentence ψ but not contain a sentence ϕ even though ϕ ≤ ψ is a member of i.  
If (a) then a characteristic set of i must contain a sentence ϕ such that ~ϕ is a member 
of i.  If (b) then a characteristic set of i must contain a sentence ψ but not contain a 
sentence ϕ even though ϕ ≤ ψ is a member of i.  Both are impossible.  If a set Σ 
characteristic for i is equal to the union of a set ξ of sets characteristic for i, then the set 
of maximally consistent subsets of Σ is equal to the union of the set of sets of maximally 
consistent subsets of members of ξ.  The intersection Σ of any nonempty set of sets 
characteristic of an index i is itself characteristic of i.  If not, then either (a) Σ must 
contain a sentence ϕ such that ~ϕ is a member of i or (b) Σ must contain a sentence ψ 
but not a sentence ϕ even though ϕ ≤ ψ is a member of i.  If (a), then a characteristic set 
of i must contain a sentence ϕ such that ~ϕ is a member of i.  If (b), then a 
characteristic set of i must contain a sentence ψ but not contain a sentence ϕ even though 
ϕ ≤ ψ is a member of i.  Both are impossible.  If a set Σ characteristic for i is equal to 
the intersection of a set ξ of sets characteristic for i then the set of maximally consistent 
subsets of Σ is equal to the intersection of the set of sets of maximally consistent subsets 
of members of ξ. QED 
 
 The canonical interpretation gives the correct truth conditions for the operator ≤.  
Proof  Every sphere in S(i) that contains a ψ-index contains a ϕ-index iff for every set of 
sentences Σ characteristic for i, Σ contains ψ only if Σ contains ϕ.  Suppose ϕ ≤ ψ is a 
member of i.  It follows immediately that any set that is characteristic for i will contain ϕ 
if it contains ψ and any sphere will contain a ϕ-index if it contains a ψ-index.  Suppose 
ϕ ≤ ψ is not a member of i.  Since ~ψ ⊃ (ϕ ≤ ψ) is a theorem of VTRU, ψ must 
be a member of i.  Consider the set Σ that contains all and only those sentences χ such 
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that χ ≤ ψ is a member of i.  Σ will not contain any sentence χ such that ~χ is a 
member of i, since ψ is a member of i and (ψ ∧ (χ ≤ ψ)) ⊃ χ is a theorem of 
VTRU.  Since all instances of ((λ ≤ χ) ∧ (χ ≤ ψ)) ⊃ (λ ≤ ψ) are theorems of VTRU 
and, thus, members of Σ, Σ will, then, be characteristic for i.  Σ does not contain sentence 
ϕ.  Therefore, there is a set of sentences Σ characteristic for i, such that Σ contains ψ but 
not ϕ and thus a sphere that contains a ψ-index but not a ϕ-index. QED 
 
Under the canonical interpretation, the function S(x) is subject to total reflexivity.  
Proof The set of all sentences ϕ such that ϕ is a member of i is characteristic of i.  Call 
this set Σ.  Given that ϕ ⊃ ϕ and the contraposed principle ϕ ⊃ ϕ are theorems of 
VTRU, every sentence that is a member of i must be a member of Σ.  It follows that i 
itself is one of the maximally consistent subsets of Σ.  Therefore, i is a member of one of 
the members of S(i). QED  
 
 Under the canonical interpretation, the function S(x) is subject to local uniformity.  
Proof  Consider two indices i and j such that j ∈ ∪S(i).  Suppose that there is a sentence 
ϕ such that ϕ is a member of i and ~ϕ is a member of j.  Given that ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
and the consequence ϕ ⊃ ~~ϕ are theorems of VTRU, it follows that ~ϕ is not 
a member of any set characteristic for i.  It follows from this that j is not a member of 
∪S(i), contrary to stipulation.   In this case, if ϕ is a member of i then ϕ is a member 
of j.  Suppose that there is a sentence ϕ such that ϕ is a member of j and ~ϕ is a 
member of i.  Given that ϕ ⊃ ϕ and the consequence ~ϕ ⊃ ~ϕ are theorems 
of VTRU it follows that ϕ is not a member of any set characteristic for i.  It follows 
from this that j is not a member of ∪S(i), contrary to stipulation.  In this case, if ϕ is a 
member of j then ϕ is a member of i.  The set of all sentences ϕ such that ϕ is a 
member of i is the largest set that is characteristic of i, and the set of all sentences ϕ such 
that ϕ is a member of j is the largest set that is characteristic of j.  Since these sets are 
equal and the members of S(i) and S(j) are nested, it follows that ∪S(i) = ∪S(j). QED 
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 Under the canonical interpretation, the function S(x) is subject to robustness.  
Proof Consider two indices i and j such that ∀S ∈ S(i), (S = Λ ∨ j ∈ S).  If j is a member 
of every nonempty member of S(i) then j must be a maximally consistent subset of every 
nonempty set characteristic for i.  Consider a sentence ϕ such that ϕ ≤ ψ is a member of 
i for any sentence ψ.  Sentence ϕ must be a member of every nonempty set that is 
characteristic for i.  Given that (ϕ ≤ ψ) ≡ (ϕ ≤ ψ) is a theorem of VTRU, if a 
sentence ϕ ≤ ψ is a member of i then (ϕ ≤ ψ) ≤ χ will be a member of i for any χ.   
Therefore, if a sentence ϕ ≤ ψ is a member of i, ϕ ≤ ψ must be a member of j.  It 
follows that a set that is characteristic for j will be characteristic for i.  Given that 
(ϕ < ψ) ≡ (ϕ < ψ) is a theorem of VTRU, if a sentence ~(ϕ ≤ ψ) is a member of i, 
(~(ϕ ≤ ψ)) ≤ χ will be a member of i for any χ.  Therefore, if a sentence ~(ϕ ≤ ψ) is 
a member of i, ~(ϕ ≤ ψ) must be a member of j.  It follows that a set that is 
characteristic for i will be characteristic for j.  In this case we have S(i) = S(j) as required.  
QED  
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